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Moe



USA
2326 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  07:46:50  Show Profile Send Moe a Private Message
In the running Sabarry debate with Mr. Amadou Dibba, Lt. Col. Samsudeen Sarr invited readers to a passing exhibition of his worldview. The disparate pieces of ideas which rightfully belong in a museum of discarded thoughts he is selling as cutting-edge fresh thinking include: an easy penchant for untenable comparisons of the best and the worst in the world as distinctions without difference to arrive at fallacious rationalizations, a ready disregard for laws of democracy, and an artful attempt to substitute unalterable reality with wistful imagination. All in the brazen effort to appease and by extension apologize once more to his former puppet-master in Banjul, or more likely in Kaninlai.

Now that he blinked first in the debate with Dibba and called it quit, I am compelled by the outstanding need to call on him for the cleaning-up operation of the litter he had left in his wake on the intellectual ground. To switch back to the previous metaphor, the objects of his exhibition adorned in the golden frame of natural impression to hide their interior fakery and ulterior motive of bedazzling and deceiving the uncritical eye constitute a cardinal sacrilege against judgment and wisdom for every minute they are left hanging in the hall of honesty. That’s why after holding back to stay above the fray of name-calling and slime-throwing that are the specialty of the on-line forum, I join without any lingering reservation the ranks of those defenders of truth who have held him and his ilk accountable for trafficking in the petty dictator’s propaganda. Misinforming and misleading the public cloaked in objective discourse carry much more viral risks than the slings and arrows of outrageous personal attacks. Hence my decision to write this rejoinder to draw further attention to his articles and focus therein like a laser beam on three key issues that bear only circumstantial significance to the debate itself, but (as my concern and purpose will show) bring very substantial miscarriage to the broad discourse about the role of government in a nation-state.

I assume that Sarr won’t mind engaging me as well while I explore these issues to their logical conclusions. I take liberty of that assumption to bring them up in a series rather than cram everything into this prolusion. This first part looks at his new position defending Jammeh’s national security claims as against his previous one denouncing that same thing.

In his last piece in the debate, he wrote:

And as what is deemed a national security threat or not, that answer can only be given by government officials privy to state secrets that are classified so. Americans still don’t understand what their national security has to do with the CIA illegally wiretapping thousands of their telephones without their knowledge or authorization. So what President Jammeh treats as a national security issue is only known to him and to perhaps those closely guided circle of officials informed about it on a need-to-know basis. (September, 2009)

This is a perfectly reasonable, generic assessment. And even where it applies to The Gambia there is little to disagree with Sarr on the surface. Mark that: on the surface! One is tempted to take easy comfort in the above quotation, as Sarr may wish, that our government, like all normal governments, is handling state secrets in a manner compatible with standard operating procedure on national security matters. Granted, even democratic governments can and sometimes do act illegally in their efforts to protect national security, as he pointed out, but there is generally a strong case of Probable Cause, unlike the situation that obtains in The Gambia.

One quick digression on the phrase: the CIA illegally wiretapping thousands of their telephones without their knowledge or authorization. The illegality of the wire-tapping program wasn’t owing to the fact that Americans had no knowledge of it or hadn’t given their authorization. Their knowledge or authorization would have simply defeated the purpose of the program to monitor terrorist activities. The illegality originated from the Bush Administration’s failure or refusal to comply with the procedural demands of the FISA Law governing such matters. If the administration had sought the required warrant from the judge of the FISA Court, who would have sat in camera and had he approved it, the secret nature of wire-tapping would have been protected and the program would have been legal whether Americans had known about it or not, and had given their authorization or not. But if the operative word is illegally in Sarr’s defensive protest to Dibba, isn’t he conceding by the implication inherent in the comparison that Jammeh is acting illegally in the name of national security? I will come back to the quotation when discussing his implausible comparisons to reach self-fulfilling rationalizations in a subsequent article.

Sarr would have his readers give the benefit of the doubt to “those closely guided circle of officials informed about” what Jammeh “treats as a national security issue…on a need-to-know basis,” as it may be in the case of their counterparts in normal governments. And more importantly he would like us to treat Jammeh’s government like any normal government. Fair enough. In fact we have no further to look than Sarr himself who had been one of “those closely guided circle of officials.” His privy knowledge of what Jammeh treated as national security while he was among “those closely guided circle of officials” is the Exhibit A of our evidence-in-chief in assessing what Jammeh classifies as state secrets. One cannot help letting the jaws slack when the seemingly plausible quotation from his last piece is cast against what he had to say about the same issues elsewhere. I challenge him to reconcile without revisionist caveats or rhetorical subjunctives the quotation above with the following excerpts about Jammeh government’s national security determinations from his book, Coup d’état by the Gambia National Army:

1) I believe [the NIA Director] made up the story in the same way members of his department had been making up stories and deceiving the authorities about everything going on in the country. That was how they could justify and maintain the existence of the national secret service bureau. The NIA was not just unprofessional but was the most unethical security institution in the country, managed by a boss Mr. Bah who had basically hired semi- literates, con artists, swindlers, rogues, and racketeers to run the agency. It was a pity that they even existed at all. (Page 214: Xlibris, 2007)

2) [Sana] Sabally was jailed for almost a decade; and had to leave in exile too. Haidara, another brutal character, lost his life in prison; and the treacherous cycle of the effects of the coup continued to create and destroy its special demons to the eyes and satisfaction of the godly public. Nevertheless, more demons continue to surface, because the dictatorial system always needed them to carry out dirty missions for the leadership. And there were always the few desperate, greedy or foolish ones to fall for the satanic bait. (Page 222)

3) [The National Security Council] had regular meetings to discus the security issues of the country and was quite instrumental in dealing with urgent matters that in the past were handled by Jammeh alone. Internal and external security matters were studied in detail and solutions found in any area posing a problem to the country. I was a member of the NSC although by appointment I was not among those heads of security forces identified by the constitution to be a member. But my boss Commander Jatta wanted me there, and he made it happened…But behind the tremendous effort of the NSC to keep the country secured and orderly, there were still some internal problems that were beyond our ability or means to tackle. The NIA, despite being equally represented by the director general in the council, were still causing problems that were not helping the system. And the fact that they would operate in stealth when on their bad games until perhaps things got out of control before they would let the NSC know it caused us a lot of confusion and embarrassment. They would exploit the impulsive nature of President Jammeh, feeding him with inaccurate information about conspiracies geared toward deposing his government that when placed under the radar would yield nothing but lies and lies and lies. But before their lies were exposed, innocent people would unnecessarily suffer for no legal justification. In most cases, such actions had merely ended up embarrassing the government. However, the NSC in those days would work hard on damage control, with the hope that the NIA would someday learn to live by the rules but I couldn’t say that it ever got better. (Page 239)

4) I could recall an incident in early 1998 when Ablie [Kujabi], still a deputy director at the [NIA], tried to get the army involved in a spiritually engineered security operation that was unfortunately blessed by Jammeh. He had invited us, the GNA principal commanders to the NIA headquarters on a Sunday afternoon for what he said was an emergency operation that the army and the NIA must perform together as soon as possible. Knowing the caliber of agents they were, we did not even bother to put on our uniforms or alert the GNA officers when we arrived at their HQ for the briefing. There were Kujabi, Foday Barry, who is another swindler and extortionist, and a few other insignificant agents. Kujabi was the one with the full story, but he had decided to conceal the most important part of it. He wanted the GNA to come up with a fully armed platoon for instant deployment to an island along the River Gambia, called Baboon Island. The only thing we had known about the island was its small size and its low shrubs on The Gambia’s map. Why we had to deploy to Baboon Island, Kujabi would not tell. He had merely kept on saying there was a serious threat to the nation’s security from the Island…“There’s a report of some insurgents with weapons in the island training to fight the government,” he had said…Normally, we were supposed to be given the information in a written form, but since it was a hasty matter, we demanded an official verbal briefing. He said the report originated from a man he was expecting at the headquarters that very day…After two hours of waiting, Kujabi finally admitted that the information actually originated from a schoolteacher who had dreamed about the conspiracy…He [argued] that the dreamer had dreamed about the [Jammeh-led] coup weeks before it happened, and it did happen in the same way he had seen it in his dreams. That was, however, the end of the story about Baboon Island. We simply got up from our seats and left their headquarters. (Page 242)

5) I cannot remember the exact day, but it was around 5:00 a.m. one morning in 1997. I was awoken from bed by a nervous officer calling from Farafenni Barracks about state guard personnel, the president’s body guards, who surprisingly walked into the camp insisting that they had been given orders to bury some salt there at different places on the ground. When they appeared carrying the salt in bags, the sentry almost opened fire on them thinking it was another attack like the one a year ago…By 9:00 a.m., we spoke to President Jammeh. He said it was a ritual prescribed to him by some special extraterrestrial forces to send his guards unannounced to that specific camp to bury the quantity of salt at different locations in the camp. The spiritual instruction, he had said, was to ensure that the action of coming to the camp, if conducted properly, would forever prevent another surprise attack of any GNA military base in the country. When we raised the risk factors involved in the surprising manner it was conducted, which could have resulted into a regrettable outcome, he merely brushed that aside swearing that he knew nothing was going to happen. “Don’t worry, gentlemen,” he had spoken with confidence, “no one will ever attack your camps again.” On July 21, however, a month or two after, Kartong Camp was attacked. (Page 244)

6) The main thing in my mind when we entered President Jammeh’s office was what he was going to tell us about the Farrafenni-salt ritual that was performed a month ago. Our camps were never to be attacked again. Now what? He, however, seemed to have forgotten about that. After we told him what had transpired [about the Kartong Camp attack] up to that moment, I thought he was at least going to ask us to first thank the soldiers on his behalf for the gallant stand they had taken to foil the bad intentions of the four men [who had attacked the camp]; but instead, he credited himself for the victory. “I had dreamed about the attack two weeks ago,” he had said smiling with a sense of the dramatic. “I had to perform special rituals to stop it from being successful,” he had continued. “Without that, they would have succeeded in overthrowing the government today and kill all of you.” He sounded as if he would never die even after the government was overthrown with all of us killed. We did not know what to say to that other than to just keep silent and listen to what he had to say next. (Page 249)

7) It was strange that every now and then, President Jammeh would shop for a large quantity of weapons that when delivered from abroad would be taken straight to his village, Kaninlai. And once the weapons were delivered there, a locality suspected of being a rear rendezvous for MFDC, it would never be seen in the Gambia again. Apparently, the quantity of weapons known to have been taken to the village of Kaninlai was sufficient to equip the GNA tenfold. What actually happened to the weapons or where they ended up being kept or delivered in Kaninlai could not be explained by any of us in the command group. That had caused a lot of people to continue accusing Jammeh of complicity in the [Casamance] war and supporting the rebels for that matter. (Page 258)

8) On Jammeh’s orders, innocent young God-fearing soldiers have been turned into bullies, butchers, and torturers of his opponents to a point where his safety and comfort in his seat is now partly or fully anchored to the existence and maintenance of those publicly-known criminals. These men in the persons of Musa Jammeh, Kawsu Camara (Bambardeh), and Alagie Martin, to name a few, are his most dangerous associates whose intimidating presence around him and his absolute dependence on them to perpetrate evil activities could one day boomerang on him without warning. (Page. 265)

9) My case was still a classic example of someone who had wrongly believed in President Jammeh. I had, in the beginning, thought that he was a leader who after all could make a difference if given the right advice on what he was doing. It eventually proved to be a naïve belief. In the end, I had to learn my lesson the hard way. (Page 278)
http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/Homepage/tabid/36/mid/367/newsid367/4540/State-Secrets-What-Samsudeen-Sarr-Said-Then-and-Now/Default.aspx

I am Jebel Musa better yet rock of Gibraltar,either or,still a stronghold and a Pillar commanding direction

The GPU wants Me Hunted Down for what I don't know .....

toubab1020



12306 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  12:16:12  Show Profile Send toubab1020 a Private Message
Moe, I am impressed,at last words of your own without the usual attendant insults and stirrings,lets see what response you get.NOT from me you understand I hate politices,good luck with it I am certain that the Politicos will latch onto the content with strong teeth.Thanks for the change of tactics.

"Simple is good" & I strongly dislike politics. You cannot defend the indefensible.
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sss



USA
82 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  13:12:05  Show Profile Send sss a Private Message
which words?MR moe,please give credit to the author when you copy and paste.it is the right thing to do.

THE MESSENGER OF GOD(peace and blessing be always upon him)SAID,"WHOEVER WALKS WITH A TYRANT IN SUPPORT OF HIM,WHILE AWARE OF HIS TYRANNY,HAS ABANDONED ISLAM."At-Tabarani
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Moe



USA
2326 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  14:39:20  Show Profile Send Moe a Private Message
Hmmmm ,I think you need to wake up from your slumber sleep ,The source ofthe article is on the bottom ,Maybe you just need some contacts.............................................peace
quote:
Originally posted by sss

which words?MR moe,please give credit to the author when you copy and paste.it is the right thing to do.


I am Jebel Musa better yet rock of Gibraltar,either or,still a stronghold and a Pillar commanding direction

The GPU wants Me Hunted Down for what I don't know .....
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toubab1020



12306 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  15:08:32  Show Profile Send toubab1020 a Private Message
MOE sss means:"By Foday Samateh" obviously The Freedom Newspaper is not the Author.

"Simple is good" & I strongly dislike politics. You cannot defend the indefensible.
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Moe



USA
2326 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  16:20:26  Show Profile Send Moe a Private Message
This is why i insult you fools ,Crackheads on the loose. I guess the source was not good enough for you ...................................................................Peace
quote:
Originally posted by toubab1020

MOE sss means:"By Foday Samateh" obviously The Freedom Newspaper is not the Author.


I am Jebel Musa better yet rock of Gibraltar,either or,still a stronghold and a Pillar commanding direction

The GPU wants Me Hunted Down for what I don't know .....
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toubab1020



12306 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  17:31:22  Show Profile Send toubab1020 a Private Message
Thats correct Moe, you are as bright as a candle in the sunshine Both are useful in their own way, but don't work well together

"Simple is good" & I strongly dislike politics. You cannot defend the indefensible.

Edited by - toubab1020 on 30 Sep 2009 17:32:50
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Moe



USA
2326 Posts

Posted - 30 Sep 2009 :  18:15:35  Show Profile Send Moe a Private Message
"Nyaka Jomm" No shame what so ever...............................Peace
quote:
Originally posted by toubab1020

Thats correct Moe, you are as bright as a candle in the sunshine Both are useful in their own way, but don't work well together


I am Jebel Musa better yet rock of Gibraltar,either or,still a stronghold and a Pillar commanding direction

The GPU wants Me Hunted Down for what I don't know .....
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